Official name
Taaleem Holdings
DFM · TAALEEM

Taaleem Holdings · What the issuer can provide
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Taaleem Holdings
TAALEEM
DFM · XDFM
AEE01136T220
Listed equity
Education · UAE premium K-12 schools, government education partnerships and early-years nurseries
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DFM · TAALEEM · Company profile
A dated profile of Taaleem’s schools and nursery investment, reporting perimeter, owners, debt and academic cash cycle.
Reading time: 10 min
Original profile prepared 31 August 2026. Dated financials and management operating data; not investment advice.
As of: 2026-05-31
Taaleem Holdings P.J.S.C. operates premium schools and public-sector education partnerships in the UAE, alongside an investment in early-years education in the UAE and Qatar. It is the DFM-listed TAALEEM issuer. School fees, school-management fees and the share of earnings from a nursery joint venture are different revenue mechanisms, not interchangeable measures of scale.
The premium portfolio spans British, International Baccalaureate, American and French education. Families pay for teaching, curriculum, facilities and continuity through school years. The economics depend on pupils, fee levels, collection and capacity utilisation, while teachers and buildings create costs before a new campus becomes full. The consolidated revenue note assigns all group revenue to the UAE; the Qatar exposure sits within the separately equity-accounted nursery business.
S2 · p. 8, 9, 10, 22 S3 · p. 4, 5, 6As of: 2026-05-31
The legal parent was incorporated on 5 February 2007. Listing on 29 November 2022 changed its status from private to public joint stock company. The financial year ends in August: a May interim report therefore covers an academic-year reporting cycle rather than a calendar-year nine-month period.
Wholly owned operating entities include Taaleem LLC and Taaleem Management LLC. Taaleem Holdings Sole Proprietorship LLC sits below Taaleem SPV Limited; the report explains contractual beneficial ownership and control for the SPV. Licences, holding companies and individual schools should not be counted as equivalent operating units. LLFPM is a controlled school acquisition, whereas Kids First Group is a joint venture despite the much larger economic stake.
S2 · p. 8, 9, 10, 25As of: 2026-05-31
The school portfolio includes Dubai British School campuses, Jebel Ali School, Raha International School, Greenfield International School, Uptown International School, Jumeira Baccalaureate School, American Academy for Girls and LLFPM. Names in a legal licence list may also include development projects; the operating metrics below are management’s dated network figures, not a count of all licences.
New capacity does not immediately become tuition revenue. DBS Mira had 696 pupils and 37.5% utilisation in its first year. The premium average gross tuition figure was AED 61,068, but this is neither a fee quote for every school nor net recognised revenue per pupil. Grade mix, discounts, authorised fee increases and the maturity of campuses all matter. DBS Islands was reclassified from an extension to a separately reported school, so the school-count increase is not purely new construction.
S2 · p. 9 S3 · p. 1, 4, 5As of: 2026-05-31
Most public-sector contracts are management arrangements with operating costs covered by the relevant authority. The accounts describe Taaleem as an agent for ADEK and ESE arrangements, recognising management fees. Dubai Schools follows a different tuition-based principal model, under which the group controls operations and obtains their economic benefits.
The government network became smaller as Ajyal schools were handed back under the transition programme. This is a change in contractual perimeter, not by itself evidence of parents abandoning the retained schools. Contract renewal, service obligations and funding arrangements must be assessed alongside enrolment. A large managed pupil population need not produce the same revenue or margin as an equally large fee-paying premium school network.
S2 · p. 9, 10 S3 · p. 5As of: 2026-05-31
LLFPM was acquired in full under the agreement dated 6 November 2024 and is consolidated. On 19 June 2025 the group acquired 95% of KFG for AED 921.33 million. The financial statements classify KFG as a joint venture accounted for using the equity method: neither its gross nursery revenue nor its EBITDA is simply added to consolidated group revenue or EBITDA.
The adjusted share of KFG profit recognised in the nine-month result was AED 10.713 million. The investment’s carrying amount was AED 925.005 million, including goodwill of AED 780.288 million. These accounting assets are not cash. KFG distributions require shareholder consent; put and call arrangements also exist. Commercial success therefore needs to translate into distributable cash, not merely higher enrolment or accounting profit.
S2 · p. 8, 14, 15, 16, 17As of: 2026-07-09
The annual governance disclosure at 31 August 2025 listed National Bonds at 22.36%, Knowledge Fund at 13.64%, ITG Family Office Limited at 7.25%, Ahmed Al Khayyat at 6.19% and Norges Bank at a rounded 5.00%. These are dated holdings, not verified live positions. The later July release uses a shorter rounded shareholder presentation and different wording for the investment-group holder; the two source presentations should not be silently treated as identical legal names.
The July release names Khalid Al Tayer as chairman and Alan Williamson as chief executive. Shareholder representation, related-party arrangements and operating management are distinct questions. The residual shareholder category is not proof of executable free float, while a large institutional holding alone does not establish sole control. This profile does not infer a current controlling shareholder from rounded percentages.
S3 · p. 2, 3, 6 S4 · p. 80As of: 2025-08-31
The audited financial year ended 31 August 2025 shows higher revenue and after-tax profit, but not every component is recurring school earnings. The original annual profit statement includes a bargain-purchase gain and a share of joint-venture loss. The comparison therefore reflects changes in the group as well as the performance of existing schools.
The annual cash-flow statement reports substantial operating inflow, yet cash spending on property and equipment exceeded that inflow before acquisitions and dividends. Growth can create an attractive future school network while consuming cash today. Readers should separate reported profitability, financing raised for expansion and the eventual cash return on invested capital. The original annual figures below are not silently replaced by later restated comparative balances.
S1 · p. 13, 14, 16| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 945.243 | 1,135.516 | S1 · p. 13, 14, 16 |
| Profit after tax | 138.002 | 164.513 | S1 · p. 13, 14, 16 |
| Operating cash inflow | 286.197 | 415.210 | S1 · p. 13, 14, 16 |
| Cash additions to property and equipment | 269.047 | 444.086 | S1 · p. 13, 14, 16 |
As of: 2026-05-31
The reviewed interim period runs to May, not September. Comparative profit is restated, including a revision of building useful lives and the resulting depreciation. Comparing the current profit with an unrevised historical press headline would mix accounting bases. Revenue is predominantly tuition, while management fees are separately disclosed.
Management reports EBITDA excluding KFG of AED 439.4 million. That alternative performance measure is not cash flow and should not be compared with net profit without its scope. Finance costs grew much faster than revenue; the group is carrying the cost of acquisitions and campus investment while newer schools mature. A profitable nine-month period is not an annual forecast, because the academic calendar and summer period change both revenue recognition and cash collection.
S2 · p. 5, 7, 14, 22 S3 · p. 1| Metric | 2025 restated | 2026 | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 984.180 | 1,166.170 | S2 · p. 5, 7, 14, 22 S3 · p. 1 |
| Profit after tax | 259.897 | 283.205 | S2 · p. 5, 7, 14, 22 S3 · p. 1 |
| Finance costs | 32.575 | 59.303 | S2 · p. 5, 7, 14, 22 S3 · p. 1 |
| Operating cash inflow | 132.077 | 132.652 | S2 · p. 5, 7, 14, 22 S3 · p. 1 |
As of: 2026-05-31
During the nine months, the change in fees received in advance reduced operating cash flow by AED 357.566 million. Fees collected before teaching are a liability until the education service is delivered. This timing helps explain why accounting profit and cash generation diverge. It does not by itself establish deteriorating collections or a permanently negative business model.
Balance-sheet cash and equivalents totalled AED 266.146 million, but AED 40.749 million was restricted to managing ADEK and ESE schools. Cash-flow-statement equivalents were therefore AED 225.397 million. A separate AED 54.054 million deposit balance also sits outside that cash-equivalent subtotal. The distinctions matter when assessing funding for own schools, debt and dividends; the highest headline cash figure is not automatically the freely spendable amount.
S2 · p. 7, 19As of: 2026-05-31
Interest-bearing borrowing totalled AED 1,507.301 million, versus AED 1,327.186 million at the prior August year-end. The current portion was AED 212.839 million; the remainder was non-current. Lease liabilities are additional contractual obligations and must not disappear from the funding analysis merely because a net-debt measure excludes them.
Borrowings are denominated in AED and linked to EIBOR plus a margin. Disclosed facilities include DBS Jumeira due in April 2027, DBS Mira-related funding in July 2027, the LLFPM acquisition facility in January 2028, Harrow Abu Dhabi in August 2028, Harrow Dubai in February 2029 and KFG acquisition financing in August 2030. These are facility maturities, not a promise that every balance remains unchanged until then. Rate exposure, refinancing and campus cash generation should be considered together.
S2 · p. 3, 4, 20, 21As of: 2026-08-31
The current IR website targets Harrow Dubai for September 2026, Harrow Abu Dhabi for 2027 and DBS Ghaf Woods after 2027. These remain planned openings, not confirmed operating campuses. New places require enrolment, staffing and regulatory readiness before they generate sustainable returns.
The nine-month statements record AED 150 million of dividends paid, corresponding to AED 0.15 per share. That is a completed distribution within the reported period, not a new proposal. This profile does not resolve the historical one-day discrepancy in the meeting date or assert an exact payment day. Expansion, debt service and shareholder distributions compete for cash; a rising payout is not proof that growth investment has become self-financing.
S2 · p. 7, 14, 25 S3 · p. 3, 4 S5As of: 2026-05-31
The main operating risks are slow filling of new campuses, regulated fee increases, wage pressure, weaker collection and loss of teaching quality or family trust. A new school can increase capacity while reducing the blended margin during its ramp-up. Government-contract transfers can change the network without a like-for-like change in demand.
The nursery model is more exposed to monthly attendance and the limits of remote early-years teaching. Management described disruption and a subsequent recovery, but that observation is not assurance of a full recovery. Acquisition goodwill, shareholder consent for KFG distributions, floating-rate debt and construction timing add financial risk. The useful tests are sustained enrolment, collection and full-academic-cycle cash returns, not a price target or a recommendation to buy or sell.
S2 · p. 14, 17, 20, 21, 22 S3 · p. 3, 4, 5, 6As of: 2026-08-31
The corporate website is www.taaleem.ae and the IR portal is ir.taaleem.ae/en. The published switchboard is +97143498806. The July results release gives nghannam@taaleem.ae for investor relations; the registered postal address in the financial statements is P.O. Box 76691, Dubai, UAE. These are disclosed business channels, not a claim that a call or email has been tested.
The financial baseline is audited FY2025 and reviewed nine months ended May 2026. The current IR results page features that interim release; this is a targeted source check, not certification that every later disclosure has been exhaustively searched. Financial tables use millions of AED rounded from original dirhams. Management operating KPIs and future plans are labelled separately, and source links retain the original accounting notes.
S2 · p. 8 S3 · p. 6 S5 S6Taaleem Holdings is a listed equity on DFM under ticker TAALEEM. Public classification: Education. Use this card to verify the issuer through its official profile, disclosures and sector metrics; it does not attribute unverified products, assets or projects to the company.
Taaleem holds a 95% economic interest in Kids First Group, and not one dirham of its nursery fees appears in group revenue. Reserved matters give the co-owner joint control, so the stake is equity-accounted: KFG's own nine-month revenue of AED 198.191m and profit of AED 17.033m stay outside the AED 1,166.170m the group reported, and only an adjusted share of AED 10.713m reaches the profit line. The nurseries also cannot distribute without shareholder consent. Anyone adding 4,714 children to the school roll is double-counting a business the accounts deliberately keep at arm's length.
The premium estate is 14 schools with 23,848 places and 18,591 students, 78.0% full, charging average gross tuition of AED 61,068 against AED 59,025 a year earlier at a 13.2 student-teacher ratio. The government estate is 23 schools with 30,556 places and 23,579 students at 77.2%, but most of those contracts pay a management fee while the authority carries operating cost; only Dubai Schools, at 4,510 students and up 35.2%, works on tuition. Abu Dhabi Charter Schools alone hold 15,922 students at 93.9%. Net tuition was 93.70% of nine-month revenue and management fees just 2.05%, which is why 23,579 government students generate a fraction of what a smaller premium roll produces.
Government schools went from 26 to 23 because four Ajyal schools were handed back and the remaining transition was planned. Enrolment fell with them. In the same period the premium side added two campuses and 2,274 places, and DBS Mira opened with 696 students at 37.5% utilisation, which drags the reported average while the cohort fills. Harrow Dubai, Harrow Abu Dhabi and DBS Ghaf Woods will add about 5,400 further places; Harrow Dubai had 374 confirmed registrations, and AED 45m of reservations is a management figure, not recognised revenue.
Revenue rose from AED 623.333m in FY2022 to AED 1,135.516m in FY2025, up 82.2%; profit went from AED 82.921m to AED 164.513m, up 98.4%; assets almost doubled again, from AED 1,960.300m to AED 4,213.861m, or 115.0%, mostly because KFG was bought in June 2025 for about AED 921.33m. Operating cash flow reached AED 415.210m. Then the nine months to 31 May 2026 show the cost of that expansion: revenue up 18.5% to AED 1,166.170m, profit up only 9.0% to AED 283.205m, and finance costs up 82.0% to AED 59.303m. Borrowings were AED 1,507.301m against AED 266.146m of cash and AED 54.054m of deposits, so net debt was AED 1,241.155m, or AED 1,544.090m with leases; every disclosed facility floats over one to three month EIBOR. Operating cash flow of AED 132.652m was flat while AED 295.270m of property spending went out, and an academic-cycle unwind of prepaid fees took AED 357.566m out of working capital.
School-level revenue, margin and capital spending are not published, so a mature campus cannot be separated from one still filling. Contract duration, renewal terms, margin and authority concentration are unreconciled for the government estate. The KFG carrying amount is 84.35% goodwill, and the put and call terms, strike, timing and funding for the minority are absent, as is any evidence of nursery cash flowing upward. The FY2025 dividend of AED 0.15 a share, AED 150m and 91.2% of owner profit, went ex on 5 December 2025, but two issuer sources date shareholder approval one day apart, 26 versus 27 November 2025, and the exact payment date is not established.
The old summary table is temporarily withheld because its display did not preserve the exact relationship between metrics, periods and labels. This is a limitation of the website table, not a claim that the issuer did not disclose the data. The review text and sources are preserved. Review documents and sources.
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